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Captive Audience Meetings and
Forced Listening
Lessons for Canada from the American Experience
SARA SLINN1
Widespread adoption of mandatory representation votes and
express protection of employer speech invite employer anti-union
campaigns during union organizing, including employer-held
captive audience meetings. Therefore, the problem of whether and
how to restrict employers’ captive audience communications during
union organizing is of renewed relevance in Canada. Captive
meetings are a long-standing feature of American labour relations.
This article considers how treatment of captive meetings evolved in
the U.S., including the notion of employee choice; the “marketplace
of ideas” view of expression dominating the American debate; and
the central role of the contest between constitutional and statutory
rights. It also considers the concept of “forced listening” and the
associated Captive Audience doctrine in U.S. constitutional law
and considers its possible application to captive audience meetings
and the Charter definition of free expression. Finally, it offers
suggestions about how Canadian labour law can benefit from
lessons learned from the American experience.
A captive audience meeting is a compulsory gathering of employees
in a workplace during which an employer delivers anti-union messages
or information. Two recent changes to the landscape of Canadian labour
relations make the problem of captive audience communications during
union organizing and their regulation newly pertinent.

– SLINN, S., Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, sslinn@osgoode.yorku.ca.
– A preliminary version of this article was presented at the Canadian Industrial Relations
Association June 2007 annual meeting in Montreal, Québec.
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First, several provinces have adopted mandatory representation
elections in recent years.1 Canadian adoption of a “quick” vote procedure,
incorporating relatively short statutory time limits for holding elections
(generally five to 10 days, varying by jurisdiction) was based on the belief
that this period would be too brief for employers to engage in effective antiunion campaigns or unfair labour practices (“ULPs”) (Weiler, 1983: 1812).
Such “quick” votes contrasted with the situation in the U.S., where 50 days
is the approximate median period between petition and election, with about
20 per cent of votes occurring more than 60 days after the petition is filed
(U.S. Department of Labor and Commerce, 1994: 68).
However, it is evident that even “quick” votes allow employers to
engage in effective union avoidance efforts before the election. For instance,
Riddell found that union avoidance tactics during the 1984 to 1992 period
of mandatory vote in B.C. were highly effective—rivalling that of such
tactics in the U.S. (Riddell, 2001), and estimated that these tactics were
twice as effective under the mandatory vote regime than under card-based
certification (Riddell, 2004). Therefore even a few days between application
and election is sufficient for effective employer anti-union conduct to
occur.2
The second important change in Canadian labour legislation is that
some provinces have recently introduced or strengthened explicit statements
of employers’ free speech rights in labour legislation. In one province at
least, B.C., it is clear these changes have greatly expanded the scope of
permissible employer communications.3 This legislative encouragement may
lead to greater use of anti-union communications by employers, including
captive meetings.
1. Originally, all Canadian jurisdictions used card-check certification procedures. Mandatory
vote procedures have since been adopted in Nova Scotia (1977), Alberta (1988), British
Columbia (1984 to 1992, 2002 to present), Saskatchewan (2008), Manitoba (1997 to
2000), Ontario (1995, though allowed unions to opt for card-based certification in the
construction industry beginning in 2005), and Newfoundland and Labrador (1994).
2. Additional criticisms of the mandatory vote procedure include objections that employers
have no legitimate role in such elections; employers do not contribute to informed worker
decisions as employers cannot and do not defend the right or interests of employees; such
elections are not legitimately analogous to political elections; and, that they encourage
employer interference in employee free choice (Becker, 1993; Weiler, 1983: 1813-1815).
The broader critical debate over choice of mandatory vote or card-based certification is
well-canvassed in Becker (1993) and Weiler (1980, 1983).
3. This 2002 amendment has been interpreted as a deliberate and significant expansion of
lawful employer expression such that B.C. now has the broadest employer speech rights
in the country (see RMH, 2005: paras. 36, 42; Convergys, 2003: para. 103). Statutes in
several other jurisdictions also contain such provisions (Canada, Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and P.E.I.).
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These changes, together with evidence that captive audience
communications are widespread in Canada and among the most effective
union-avoidance tactics (Bentham, 2002; Riddell, 2001; Thomason and
Pozzebon, 1998), suggest it is time to re-examine the legal treatment of
employer speech—and captive communications in particular—during
organizing in Canada.
A useful first step is to consider the American experience with captive
communications, as representation elections and employer anti-union
campaigns are a long-standing feature of unionization in the United States. As
the Supreme Court of Canada has observed, development of Canadian law can
benefit from careful use of lessons learned from the American experience:
Notwithstanding our differences, it may be helpful here to look at the American
experience, not with a view to applying their decisions blindly but rather to
learn from the process through which they were derived (Commonwealth,
1991: para. 82).

Given the close history and parallels between the NLRA and Canadian
labour legislation the value of a comparative approach may be particularly
true for Canadian labour law. Both the American NLRA and Canadian
labour legislation promise employees the right to make a choice about union
representation free of interference.4 This employee “right to free choice”
is the most important employee right relevant to the conduct of captive
audience communications by employers during organizing.
In American discourse, captive audience communications are characterized as a clash between employees’ right to free choice under the NLRA and
employers’ constitutional right to free speech. Framing the question in this
way has, as we will see, to a significant degree determined the outcome of
the battle in favour of employers’ ability to require their employees to listen
to their communications and influence the outcome of elections.
This article begins with a brief description of existing treatment of
employer speech and captive audience communications in Canada, then
considers the theory of the “marketplace of ideas,” a free speech doctrine
dominating American debate over regulating captive audience meetings. The
article then addresses the issue’s central jurisprudential battle: the contest
between constitutional and statutory rights. It concludes by considering what
lessons the American experience offers for Canadian labour law.
EMPLOYER COMMUNICATIONS IN CANADA
In Canada the federal jurisdiction and British Columbia represent two
ends of the spectrum of approaches to employer speech and captive audience
4. See, e.g., ss. 4(1), 6 and 9 of the B.C. Labour Relations Code, and s. 7 of the NLRA.
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communications. The federal jurisdiction stands alone in Canada in its
restrictive approach to employer communications, requiring employers to
remain “strictly neutral” (Ganeca Transport, 1990: 209) and prohibiting
captive audience communications during organizing “…because of the
nature of the meeting and apart from the specific content of what was
said…” (Bank of Montreal, 1985: para. 67).5
British Columbia represents the other extreme, only limiting employer
speech that is coercive or intimidating, and permitting employers to express
biased views that are uninformed or unreasonable (Convergys, 2003: para.
112). Captive audience communications are not unlawful per se, though will
be closely scrutinized, and the context and cumulative effect of the speech
“…may render otherwise permissible expression coercive or intimidating.
In each case, both the content and the method used must be considered.”
(RMH, 2005: paras. 34, 56, 57, 61, 69). A captive audience meeting will
considered coercive if the timing or other circumstances of the meeting
deny employees a reasonable opportunity to make inquiries and assess the
employer’s views (Simpe ‘Q’, 2007: paras. 79, 89, 138).
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
The Concept
Four categories of values are recognized as underlying the freedom of
expression: a means of seeking truth, ensuring self-fulfilment, a means for
ensuring participation in political and social decision-making, and a way to
balance stability and change in society (Emerson, 1963: 878).6
Among the most prominent conceptions of the first value, truth-seeking,
is the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, introduced by Justice Holmes in
his influential dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, where he
stated:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas–that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market…. (1919: 630).

5. Though express employer speech protection was introduced into the legislation in 1998,
the federal labour board has held that Parliament did not intend to change the existing
case law with the addition of this provision (Air Canada, 2001: para. 35).
6. Thomas Emerson first identified four categories of values underlying free expression
(1963: 878). In Canada, Sharpe (1987) combined the third and fourth categories, and
this three-category approach was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. These are
the three values now routinely cited in Canadian law. For discussion of these values in
Canadian law, see Keegstra (1990: 727-728) and Irwin Toy (1989: para. 53).
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According to this theory, competing self-interested behaviour in the
realm of ideas will ultimately work to society’s benefit, just as in the case
of the economic market (Strauss, 1991: 349). Truth will emerge from
competition among ideas, even when truth is met with falsehood, and
resists all silencing or censoring of expression (Ingber, 1984: 6). Thus, the
government or society should not suppress ideas that they believe to be
false, because in so doing they will in fact suppress some true beliefs as
well. Society must recognize human fallibility by allowing the expression
of contrary views (Shauer, 1982).
This concept has come to dominate American decisions on captive
meetings. It is this first underlying value and the marketplace metaphor that
we see driving (implicitly or expressly) legislative and NLRB approaches
to employer speech during organizing (see, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 1945:
537; Story, 1995: 387).
Criticisms of the Marketplace Metaphor
The marketplace metaphor has been heavily criticized, both in
conception and in its application to the workplace context. Critics query
the assumption that there is an “objective truth” to be found. Story
contends this is an unwarranted assumption, particularly in the workplace
and with regard to representation questions. The answer to such questions
is very much subjective and influenced by individuals’ experiences and
background (Story, 1995: 398-90), and evidence of the “experience good”
nature of union representation adds force to this argument (see Bryson et
al., 2005).
Another questionable assumption underlying this theory is that there
exists a perfect market in expression. Critics point out the possibility of
a perfect market is a fiction that economists acknowledged long ago, and
the marketplace of ideas is susceptible to the same shortcomings of all
free markets, which can frustrate the goal of achieving the truth, and could
potentially allow the hegemonic group to define what is true (see, e.g.,
Ingber, 1984: 5). Critics challenge the assumption that truth rather than
simply power will prevail in the marketplace, arguing that unrestrained
expression may actually entrench established interests and privilege rather
than changing society (Ingber, 1984: 15, 76). Thus, like other markets, a
marketplace of ideas requires regulation to correct market failures caused
by real world conditions (Ingber, 1984: 5).
In the workplace context market failure arises from the unequal
competition established by the property and managerial rights granted to
the employer, and the unbalanced right to speak flowing from these rights.
The result is that there is not necessarily any exchange or dialogue in the
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workplace, nor are listeners necessarily willing consumers of the single
product on offer in this market: the employer’s views (Story, 1995: 383385). Story contends that, rather than a “marketplace,” the workplace is
more accurately characterized as “an all-but-monopolized forum subject to
strictly defined and limited incursions by non-owners” (Story, 1995: 388). In
this forum there is no exchange and, due to property and managerial rights,
expression is not free and entry by certain speakers—union organizers, for
instance—is barred (Story, 1995: 383-385).
Story allows that there may be an argument that there are other
marketplaces for ideas outside the workplace where union representation
questions may be aired, and this may offset employers’ dominance of the
workplace market, producing ideas which will “seep into the representation
election marketplace” (Story, 1995: 389). However, Story is sceptical of
this, asserting that these “outside” marketplaces are hostile to the notion
of worker collective action and instead will “reinforce and naturalize the
barriers to workplace unionization” (Story, 1995: 389).
Finally, critics also contend that the marketplace metaphor rests on too
much faith in individuals’ ability to make sophisticated, rational assessment
of messages, requiring listeners to be able to distinguish the form from the
substance of communications (see Ingber, 1984: 7-8). The danger, Ingber
notes is that the marketplace may “…favour the most attractively packaged
ideas rather than those with the ‘best’ substance” (Ingber, 1984: 16).
CONTEST OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS
In America, the question of restricting employer speech during
organizing has generally been posed as a contest between employers’ First
Amendment right to free speech (in addition to their common law and
statutory property and managerial rights) and workers’ statutory right to
freely choose to unionize, though this approach has been strongly criticized
(see Andrias, 2003: 2416). The inevitable result of pitting a mere statutory
right against constitutional right is that workers’ statutory rights bow to
employer’s speech rights.7
To an extent this may reflect the structure of the American Constitution
which, lacking an analogue to our section 1 balancing provision, leads to
markedly different judicial interpretation of constitutional protection of
expression than in Canada.8 In short, application of the First Amendment
7. The next part of this article traces this victory of employer speech rights over protection
of employees’ free choice.
8. See Greenawalt (1992) for a comprehensive comparison of constitutional treatment of
expression in the two countries.
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is a largely categorical assessment, involving one question: is the speech in
question included or excluded from First Amendment protection? In Canada,
there are three questions: Is the activity expressive, and thus presumptively
protected by section 2(b) of the Charter? Does it lose this protection because
of the method or location of the activity? If it is protected, is the limitation
reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society under section 1 of
the Charter? Section 1 permits more of a balancing of interests approach
to determining limits to constitutional rights.
This differing constitutional architecture may also make it more difficult
to restrict employer speech in the U.S. than in Canada. Nevertheless, even
in Canada there is danger in framing the question of captive audience
limits as a contest between a constitutional and statutory right. Even under
Canadian law, posing the question in this manner may largely determine
the answer.
RISE AND FALL OF THE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE DOCTRINE
IN THE UNITED STATES
The American NLRA was part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal
reforms and met with tremendous resistance from political opponents and
employers. The question of limits on employer speech during organizing,
and captive audience communications in particular, was a contentious issue
throughout the early decades of the NLRA’s life. Different approaches
dominated at different times, often coinciding with shifts in government
power and in composition of the President-appointed NLRB.9 These
approaches clearly differ in the importance placed on different aspects of
the effect of the speech on employees’ free choice: content, method, and
timing of the communication, and the opportunity for union response.
These approaches developed against the following statutory framework.
Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labour organizations, and to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and section 8(a)(1) prohibits
employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7. Violation of section 8(a)(1)
would be an ULP.

9. NLRB members are appointed by the President on the advice and consent of the Senate.
Created under a Democrat President, the NLRB was initially empanelled with three
Democrat members. Not until October 1941 was a Republican member, Gerard D. Reilly,
appointed to the NLRB. See Cooke et al. (1995) for empirical evidence of the influence
of political party of appointment on NLRB member decision-making.
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Employer Neutrality and Totality of Circumstances (1935)
The original panel of the NLRB, consisting of three Democratappointed members, required employers to remain strictly neutral in their
communications with employees during organizing, but afforded no special
protection to safeguard employees from captive audience communications
(NLRB v. Federbush, 1941). The manner or method of the employer’s
communication was simply one factor taken into account in determining
whether an employer had committed an ULP. The rationale for the neutrality
standard was that employers’ communications to employees “have a force
independent of persuasion” arising from employers’ greater economic
power and employees’ economic dependence on their employer (NLRB v.
Federbush, 1941: 975). Therefore, restrictions on employer communications
focused on the content of the speech, though with explicit recognition that
employer speech has an inherent influence on workers.
Totality of Conduct Doctrine (1940)
This strict neutrality requirement was replaced by the “totality of
conduct” doctrine in a 1940 decision of two of the three Democrat-appointed
NLRB members serving at the time (Virginia Electric, 1940). The totality
of conduct doctrine provided that an employer was entitled to express its
opinion about organizing to employees, except where the communications
were part of a course of conduct that restrained or coerced employees’
free choice. Where speech and conduct, examined together, were coercive,
it would be an ULP. With this rule, the NLRB’s focus remained on the
content of speech, but with refined recognition of the coercive tendency of
employer communications.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument that this
decision violated its First Amendment rights, stating that:
… pressure exerted vocally by the employer may no more be disregarded than
pressure exerted in other ways. For “Slight suggestions as to the employer’s
choice between unions may have telling effect among men who know the
consequences of incurring that employer’s strong displeasure.” International
Association of Machinists v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. 72,
78 (NLRB v. Virginia Electric, 1941: 476-477).

This was followed in 1945 by a U.S. Supreme Court decision explicitly
recognizing that “…employers’ attempts to persuade to action with respect
to joining or not joining unions are within the First Amendment’s guaranty”
(Thomas v. Collins, 1945: 537). It is at this point that employer speech
rights began its real ascendance in American labour law, buoyed by the
First Amendment.
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Clark Bros. Captive Audience Doctrine (1946)
Against this backdrop, the NLRB introduced the short-lived “captive
audience” doctrine in its 1946 Clark Bros. decision, from which the sole
Republican member dissented. It held that a captive audience meeting,
in and of itself and separate from any other conduct of the employer and
apart from the content of the speech, constitutes interference, restraint,
and coercion within the meaning of the NLRA and therefore constitutes
an ULP (Clark Bros., 1946: 804-805). Such an ULP is separate and apart
from considerations of conduct and content, relying strictly on the method
of communication: to a captive audience. The NLRB expressly held that
forced or captive communications are unlawful, even if that speech falls
under the protection of the First Amendment, because forcing employees
to receive employer communications removes employee free choice (Clark
Bros., 1946: 804-805). The NLRB emphasized that the employer had other
avenues to express its views, and likened a captive audience meeting to
physical restraint of the audience (Clark Bros., 1946: 805).
Legislative Reversal (1947)
Nineteen forty-six also saw the end of World War II for the U.S. This
brought tremendous unemployment and price inflation, and many lengthy
strikes in several industries as unions that had their agreements frozen
or subject to National War Labour Board wage controls or were subject
to reciprocal management-labour no-work-stoppage pledges protecting
wartime production, sought to catch up (NLRB: 18, 19). These widespread
and devastating disputes contributed to a growing popular view that labour
had become too politically and economically powerful. This helped the
Republicans gain majorities in both houses of Congress in the November
1946 elections, which had been dominated by Democrats since 1930
(Ludwig, 2007: 2; NLRB: 19).
This shift in political power and popular anti-union sentiment provided
the setting for the 1947 amendments to the NLRA (the Labor-Management
Relations Act or “LMRA”). The LMRA was compromise legislation based
on one bill introduced by Representative Hartley and passed in the House
of Representatives, and one introduced by Senator Taft and passed in the
Senate, in May 1947. Congress overrode President Truman’s veto of the
LMRA (NLRB: 22).
The purpose of the LMRA was to moderate union power so as to restore
the balance between labour and management that the NLRA had disrupted
(Hartley, 1948: xii-xiv). One significant element of the LMRA was to
introduce the section 8(c) employer free speech provision into the NLRA
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as an exception to the section 8(a)(1) prohibition on employer inter-ference.10
LMRA supporters contended it was necessary to explicitly recognize
employer speech rights because employers’ First Amendment rights were
being violated by the Clark Bros. captive audience doctrine (Andrias, 2003:
2427; U.S. Congress, 1948: 292, 297, 407, 429).11 Therefore, one objective
of section 8(c) was to override the Clark Bros. captive audience doctrine
and prevent the NLRB from finding captive audience communications to
be ULPs per se (Note, 1978-9: 761). A second purpose was to prevent the
NLRB from misusing the totality of conduct doctrine by prohibiting it from
finding employer speech to be coercive because of a separate employer
ULP or from relying on evidence of non-coercive employer statements to
establish that other employer conduct was an ULP (Note, 1978-9: 761).
These effects of section 8(c) were affirmed in a 1948 NLRB decision
which held that both the language of the section and its legislative history
made it clear that the Clark Bros. captive audience doctrine was no longer
applicable (Babcock & Wilcox, 1948: 578). Babcock & Wilcox was decided
by a panel containing three of the five NLRB members: two Democrats and
one Republican, with none dissenting.12 Consequently, employer speech was
protected and could not be an ULP where it did not “…by its own terms
threaten force or economic reprisal” (Jackson and Heller, 1982: 50; U.S.
Congress, 1948: 56). Furthermore, any speech falling within section 8(c)
could not be used as evidence of an employer ULP (Jackson and Heller,
1982: 49). Therefore, section 8(c) returned the emphasis of employer
speech restrictions to the content of the communication, and away from
the manner or method the employer used to convey its views (Babcock &
Wilcox, 1948).
The Equal Opportunity Rule (1951)
A form of captive audience protection was briefly revived in 1951
when the NLRB met the challenge of section 8(c) by establishing the “equal
opportunity” rule in the Bonwit Teller case, with the sole Republican on the
five-member panel dissenting in part from the majority’s decision. Under
10. S. 8(c) reads: “The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act... if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”
11. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that s. 8(c) does not create any new employer right,
but “merely implements the First Amendment” (NLRB v. Gissel, 1969: 617).
12. Note that the LMRA also expanded the NLRB to five members, with one Democrat and
one Republican appointed in August 1947 to fill the two new positions. However, all
five members need not decide each case: NLRA s. 3(b) authorizes the NLRB to delegate
decision-making to a three-person panel.
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this rule, an employer would commit an ULP if it communicated with
employees in the workplace during working time, but did not allow the
union an equal opportunity to respond. Because this rule did not actually
limit employer speech, the NLRB concluded that it did not run afoul of
section 8(c) (Bonwit Teller, 1951: 615). The NLRB identified, as a separate
justification for its decision, the fundamental consideration that employees’
section 7 rights include a right to “hear both sides” (Bonwit Teller, 1951:
612). By denying the union an opportunity to address employees “under
the same advantageous circumstances as the [employer] had made available
to itself,” the employer had “created conditions incompatible with a free,
uncoerced choice in the election” (Bonwit Teller, 1951: 613).
Rather than focusing on the manner or content of the communication,
this rule centres on whether or not the union has an opportunity to respond
to the employer’s message. The NLRB’s concern was whether employees’
right to be informed was satisfied and, therefore, their right to free choice
was fulfilled. The effect of this decision was to transform the question of
whether employee free choice was protected into a question of whether
employees had received information from both sides. This version of
“informed choice” was “free choice,” in the Board’s view.
The Peerless Rule (1953)
The equal opportunity rule was soon overturned and replaced in a pair
of decisions, Livingston Shirt and Peerless Plywood, issued on the same
day in 1953, with the NLRB majority characterizing the rule as the “…
discredited Clark Bros. doctrine in scant disguise” (Livingston Shirt, 1953:
407). By this time, under Republican President Eisenhower, Congress and
the NLRB both had Republican majorities. Three of five NLRB members
were Republican, and the full panel ruled on both decisions, in each case
with one of the two Democrat members dissenting in full or in part.
The Livingston Shirt majority explained that the equal opportunity
doctrine was unworkable in practice, encouraging employers and unions
to jockey for position to claim the advantage of being the last to address
workers, adding a new element to the competition for workers’ votes
(Livingston, 1953: 407). Employers’ greater access to the workplace again
favours them in this competition. This doctrine also essentially negated
employers’ speech rights by linking a right of reply to the speech right
(1953: 406).
In its place, the majority in Peerless created the Peerless rule that
remains in effect today, prohibiting both employers and unions from holding
speeches on company time to massed assemblies of employees within 24
hours of a scheduled election (1953: 429). So, to this minimal extent, it
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limits captive audience communications. The Peerless majority explained
that its rationale for the rule was based on its election experience that lastminute speeches “…to massed assemblies of employees on company time
have an unwholesome and unsettling effect and tend to interfere with that
sober and thoughtful choice which a free election is designed to reflect” and
that they tend “…to destroy freedom of choice and establish an atmosphere
in which a free election cannot be held” (1953: 429-430). Therefore an
opportunity for employees to rationally assess arguments and employee
free choice were ostensibly the majority’s guiding concerns.
The majority emphasized that the real mischief and harm of last-minute
speeches to mass assemblies on company time lay in their timing and use
of company time, and applied equally to employer and union-delivered
speeches. Therefore, a 24-hour ban would be sufficient protection for
employees (Peerless, 1953: 429). The Livingston majority concluded
that, beyond giving employees this 24 hour “breathing spell,” no further
restraints on employer speech are needed: “With this rule in election cases,
we see no reason in law or equity for seeking to impose further restraints”
(1953: 408). At the same time, the NLRB emphasized that this Rule
didn’t unnecessarily restrict employer speech rights, since other forms of
communication, or speeches held at any time (even with 24 hours of the
election), and whether at the workplace or elsewhere, so long as employee
attendance was voluntary and it was not during working time (Peerless,
1953: 430). With this decision, special protection from captive audience
communications was all but extinguished.
The Peerless rule removed emphasis on the manner of expressing the
opinion and the opportunity to respond, instead focusing solely on the timing
and location of the communication. Otherwise, the “totality of conduct”
approach governs for determining whether employer speech is coercive
and thus unlawful.
The Modern Approach: The Peerless Rule
The Peerless rule remains the key restriction on employer communications, displacing any specific rule concerning captive audiences. At
present, the test for whether employer communications during organizing
constitute an ULP is whether the speech tends to be coercive (not whether
it is, in fact, coercive) in the totality of the circumstances from employees’
perspective (NLRB v. Pneu Electric, 2002). It is still the case that, if a
communication is found to fall within the protection of section 8(c), then
it cannot be found to be an ULP (Brown & Root, 1996: 633). Employers
remain able to compel captive audiences during working time other than
during the last 24 hours before the vote, prevent workers and unions from
responding, and can discipline workers for failing to attend or leaving
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such meetings (NLRB v. USWA, 1958). As one commentator describes it,
captive audience communications are “now considered to be integral to the
employer’s right to freedom of speech….” (Andrias, 2003: 2439).
The durability of the Peerless rule may be due less to its adequacy than
to the evident political obstacles to employee-friendly change to American
labour law, as demonstrated by the repeated failure of the Employee Free
Choice Act to pass in Congress (2007), and the often Republican-dominated
NLRB.
FREEDOM FROM FORCED LISTENING OUTSIDE
THE WORKPLACE
The experience of captive audiences in American organizing campaigns
has been quite different than that of captive audiences elsewhere in that
country. Entirely outside the labour context, time, place and manner limits
on free speech and a separate “Captive Audience doctrine” have developed
in U.S. constitutional law as a justification for government restrictions on
speech to captive audiences (see Hill v. Colorado, 2000; Frisby v. Schultz,
1988). Such justified restrictions are commonly applied in cases such as
door to door soliciting, billboards, telephone soliciting, mail, public address
systems, and residential picketing. This is an interesting counterpoint to
the treatment of captive listeners during union organizing, demonstrating
that employers are among the most constitutionally privileged speakers in
America.
This Captive Audience doctrine is commonly identified as arising from
the right to privacy (a “penumbral” rather than explicit, constitutional right),
providing an exception to the First Amendment. Privacy interests of the
listener are weighed against the speaker’s First Amendment rights in the
“intrusion test,” which requires proof that “substantial privacy rights are
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner” for the captive audience
protection to apply and restriction of the communication to be justified (see,
e.g., Cohen v. California, 1971). Courts have tended to put greater onus on
audiences to avoid unwanted speech in a public forum compared to private
homes (Cohen v. California, 1971).
Commentators identify several values underlying this doctrine:
individual autonomy, the right to repose, and the right to be free of offensive
communications.13 The second justification, a right not to be disturbed or
intruded upon by uninvited communications, particularly when one is in the
private sphere (Strauss, 1991-1992: 111-114; Haiman, 1972: 175), is firmly
13. See Strauss (1991-1992); Taylor (1983); Haiman (1972) for differing interpretations of
these underlying values.
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rooted in the privacy right origins of the doctrine and, consequently, has
little application to workplace captivity. Regarding the final justification,
Canadian law has firmly rejected restricting speech simply because of its
offensive nature (see, e.g., Keegstra, 1990; Butler, 1992). It is the value
of individual autonomy explanation that has greatest resonance with the
question of captive audiences and speech rights in the workplace, and is
the factor this article focuses on.
Individual Autonomy and Forced Listening
Several commentators identify an interest in autonomy (though
differently articulated) as underlying the Captive Audience doctrine (Taylor,
1983: 216; Strauss, 1991-1992: 108-111; Haiman, 1972: 174). Taylor
defines individual autonomy as freedom of thought and personal autonomy
(1983: 216). On the other hand, Strauss contends that individual autonomy
centres on free decision-making, requiring that individuals’ decisions
relating to intimacy or personal identity be free from intrusion to preserve
the decision-making authority of the individual (1991: 106, 108-9). She
concludes that “Forced listening by definition removes decision-making
authority from the individual” (Strauss, 1991-1992: 109). More simply,
Haiman characterizes individual autonomy not as autonomy in decisionmaking, but simply autonomy of hearing such that there is a right to decide
whether to receive speech (Haiman, 1972: 174).
Taylor and Strauss’ descriptions of this interest most clearly match
the interest in autonomy underlying our right to free expression (1983,
1991-1992). Each of these articulations of the justification closely matches
explanations of values underlying free expression under the Canadian
Charter. Taylor explains the rationale behind the necessary link between
autonomy and protection for captive audiences:
If freedom of thought and personal autonomy of the listener require that the
government refrain from suppressing an idea or communication, the same
principles forbid the government from forcing an unwilling listener to receive
a communication (Taylor, 1983: 216).

Free Speech as a Source of the Captive Audience Doctrine
Though the Captive Audience doctrine has been identified as rooted
in the American conception of privacy (Strauss, 1991-1992) other
commentators contend that, rather than an emanation of the right to privacy
and a form of restriction on the First Amendment, the American Captive
Audience doctrine is better regarded as a corollary to the First Amendment
(Taylor, 1983), or that it is actually a form of time, place and manner
restriction on the First Amendment (Nauman, 2002). Certainly a number
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of cases have limited speech to captive audiences on the basis that it is a
justifiable time, place and manner restriction of First Amendment protected
speech rather than on the basis of the Captive Audience doctrine and its
intrusion test (see, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 1988).
Taylor suggests, rather than applying the “intrusion test,” pitting privacy
rights against free speech rights, the captive audience doctrine be viewed
as arising from the free speech right, as a corollary right, rather than from
another source. Then, the limits and scope of captive audience protection
would be determined by a balancing of competing interests. Taylor suggests
that the captive audience doctrine, or the right not to be spoken to, is a
corollary of the constitutional protection of free speech, rather than an
exception to it (Taylor, 1983: 214, 216).
LESSONS FOR CANADA
The American experience with employers’ captive audience communications during union organizing provides some lessons about how
Canadian labour law may develop its own approach to this question. It
offers some cautions about framing questions of competing rights, and
about accepting simple solutions to the problem of captive communications.
It also shows possible ways forward to develop a more holistic definition
of free expression and its limits, through careful selection of underlying
values, a balanced understanding of the expression right and through the
incorporation of concepts of captivity and forced listening.
Framing the Question
One key lesson of the American experience is the importance of how the
question of restrictions on employer communications is framed. One of the
greatest impediments to employer speech protections for workers in America
is that the courts and NLRB have framed the problem as a contest between
employers’ constitutional right to free speech and workers’ merely statutory
right to free choice. This is a contest that workers rights cannot—and have
not—won, under the American system. We see this, for example, in how
the Clark Bros. captive audience doctrine was so readily overcome with the
LMRA and concerns over employers’ First Amendment speech rights.
As noted above, Canadian constitutional law provides more scope for
limiting expression, and thus protecting statutory rights, primarily because
of the opportunity section 1 allows for balancing rights and interests
(Commonwealth, 1991: para. 80). And, so far, early challenges to statutory
restrictions on employer communications, including the federal strict
neutrality standard and prohibition on captive audience communications
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have been saved under section 1 (Bank of Montreal, 1985; Cardinal,
1996).
However, reliance on the section 1 saving provision is a precarious
foundation for employee protection, and is subject to case-by-case decision
making. It is important to recognize that concern over impinging on
employer constitutional speech rights has, like the LMRA amendments,
underpinned statutory extensions to employer speech rights and limitations
on ULP prohibitions in at least one Canadian jurisdiction (British Columbia,
2002a: 5; 2002b: 3508, 3377, 3546). Therefore, Canadian law is not immune
from the problems arising from a contest of constitutional and statutory
rights.
Rather than framing the question as such a contest, the American
experience suggests that it is important to focus on developing a conception
of free expression that is sensitive to the particular characteristics of
communication in the workplace context, where the employer-speaker has
uncommon power and influence over the listener-employee, and where
captive audience communications are common.
Deceptive Solutions
The American experience with the equal opportunity and Peerless rules,
in particular, should make us cautious of simply addressing the captive
audience problem by requiring that the union has an opportunity to respond
to employer statements or that employees have “breathing space” before
the representation election. B.C. is following a similar path, distinguishing
permissible from unlawful captive meetings by whether employees have
an opportunity to reflect and make enquiries following the meeting (Simpe
‘Q’, 2007).
Such formalistic limits are misleading, and do not address the true
mischief of employer speech to a captive audience of workers. Such rules
give insufficient weight to the fact that expression has both form and
content; that form affects the message received by the listener; and that
form and content can be difficult to separate. They ignore the inherent
pressure and emotive force of employer words, arising from the context and
history of the employment relationship. The NLRB in Clark Bros. correctly
diagnosed the real problem with captive communication: the restraint and
compulsion akin to physical restraint that employees are subjected to, and
all that flows from that in influencing employee free choice (1946: 805).
A union’s message, even in the same location and delivered for the same
time as the employer’s, simply cannot match the employer’s influence. The
union cannot speak with the same force as the employer and it is unrealistic
to expect employees, after being subjected to captive communications, to
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make their own enquiries to test the veracity of their employer’s statements.
This ignores the irrational effect of such communications on listeners.
Underlying Values
A second important lesson from the American experience is the danger
of placing too great reliance on the truth-seeking justification for free speech
and, in particular, on the marketplace of ideas conception of this right.14 This
metaphor is unrealistic and perhaps particularly ill-suited to the workplace
environment, placing too much focus on the interests of the speaker, and
too much responsibility on the listener to be able to separate truth from
falsehood, and messages from manipulation. Rather, it would be desirable
to refocus on the other underlying values: autonomy, and democratic and
social participation, both of which hold the rights and interests of listeners
in greater regard.
Both the equal opportunity and Peerless rules share the “marketplace
of ideas” as their implicit driving rationale. This is apparent, first, in their
focus on protecting the interests of the speaker over that of the listener.
The marketplace conception is particularly evident in the nature of the
equal opportunity solution to employer speech at captive meetings: more
speech. The notion that “speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer
propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental
policies” is a central theme of this view of First Amendment speech
(Dennis v. U.S., 1951: 503). There is a danger in accepting that more speech
cures, as it presumes there is equality in the competing messages. This is
particularly implausible in the workplace organizing context, where the
union lacks the same access to workers that employers enjoy (even when
granted the “equal opportunity” of on-site meetings with employees), and
the force of union speech cannot match that of the employer for all the
well-recognized reasons that make employer speech unique.
Forced Listening and Free Expression
The American experience also highlights the importance of considering
whether and how the Charter freedom of expression might incorporate
protection of captive listeners. The Captive Audience doctrine American
constitutional law has developed outside of the workplace, and the
scholarly arguments about the potential for incorporating it into the First
Amendment, give us some direction about how our own constitutional

14. See Weinrib (2001: 345-346) for a critique of the Supreme Court of Canada’s absorption
of American free speech doctrine such as the marketplace of ideas.
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freedom of expression may be developed to more tightly embrace protection
of listeners.15
Canadian courts and labour boards have recognized some glimmer
of a right not to listen, holding that section 2(b) does not guarantee the
speaker an audience and does not guarantee that a person can be forced
to listen (Committee, 1991: 204-05; Dieleman, 1994; Bank of Montreal,
1985; RMH, 2005: paras. 39, 40; Simpe ‘Q’, 2007, para. 123). However,
Canadian courts and boards have not recognized that section 2(b) contains
freedom from forced listening analogous to the American right or that there
is a true negative or corollary right to the freedom of expression, though
many of these cases cite and draw reasoning from American constitutional
freedom from forced listening cases. The B.C. labour board has, however,
expressly adopted the concept of freedom from forced listening as a tool
for regulating captive audience communications (RMH, 2005; Simpe ‘Q’,
2007). It identifies forced listening as coming “…closer to capturing the
essence of what can make an otherwise acceptable employer expression
of views during an organizing drive coercive or intimidating” and helps
identify the appropriate balance between expression rights and employee
free choice (RMH, 2005: 58, 59).
The concept of forced listening is central to problem of captive audiences
in labour relations, and brings to the fore the tension between protection of
speakers and listeners. These are concepts and dilemmas that need greater
attention in the definition of the Charter freedom of expression.
Forced Listening and Privacy
Unlike the American constitution, the Canadian Charter contains no
free-standing right to privacy (Cheskes, 2007: para. 79). However, some
degree of privacy protection is found in the section 8 Charter protection
against unreasonable search or seizure (Hunter, 1984), though section 8
applies to limited circumstances not generally relevant to the union
organizing context. The section 7 right to “life, liberty and security of the
person” has also been interpreted as protecting certain privacy interests
(O’Connor, 1995; Cheskes, 2007: para. 81). These include from physical
restraint, or from state interference in important and fundamental life
decisions (see, e.g., Cheskes, 2007; Godbout, 1997; Thomson, 1990), and
protection from serious state-imposed harm to an individual’s physical or
psychological integrity by interfering with personal autonomy (Rodriguez,
1993).
15. Alternatively, the rationales for this American doctrine, and the balancing approach of
the “intrusion test” could be introduced into the section 1 or exclusion analyses under
our Charter.
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However, neither section 7 nor 8 has given rise to any notion similar to
that of the American Captive Audience doctrine, nor have they been applied
to workplace communications. Therefore, protection for captive audiences
is more likely to be found, in Canada, in the free expression right than in
the very limited privacy protections afforded by the Charter.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the American experience has produced a sad trajectory of
protection for captive audiences. Employer speech rights, grounded in the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, have almost wholly trumped
employee rights under the NLRA, and recognition of employees’ right
or ability not to receive employer communications has been virtually
extinguished (Andrias, 2003; Story, 1995). Nevertheless, examining the
American experience with the problem of communications to captive
audiences—both in and out of the workplace—provides both cautions and
opportunities as Canadian labour law struggles with this question.
❚
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RÉSUMÉ
Rencontres en auditoire contraint et écoute obligatoire : leçons
tirées de l’expérience américaine
Avec l’adoption récente et largement répandue du vote de représentation
obligatoire et d’une protection explicite du droit de parole de l’employeur,
avec le recours intensif aux rencontres en auditoire contraint comme
tactique anti-syndicale, l’encadrement juridique de la communication en
privé au Canada vaut la peine d’être réévalué. L’expérience américaine en
matière d’auditoire contraint sert d’enseignement approprié au moment de
la formulation d’une approche canadienne.
De nombreux facteurs ont façonné l’expérience américaine. D’abord,
l’approche américaine a subi l’influence du « marché des idées » eu égard
à la liberté d’expression. Essentiellement, la métaphore du marché prétend
que la vérité va surgir de la confrontation des idées. Cependant, dans un
contexte de relations du travail, cette métaphore peut bien s’avérer inutile.
Son application est minée par de nombreux facteurs, incluant les échecs
du marché, le pouvoir inégal de l’employeur et du poids de son message,
l’inaptitude des employés à établir une distinction entre la forme et la
substance en matière de communication.
Un autre facteur important réside dans la façon dont est encadré le
conflit entre le discours et l’effort de syndicalisation. La question s’est
habituellement posée en termes de conflit entre le droit d’expression des
employeurs en vertu du Premier Amendement et le droit statutaire des
travailleurs d’adhérer librement à un syndicat ou non. Inévitablement, un
droit constitutionnel l’emporte sur le droit statutaire. Si la question est
formulée de la même manière au Canada, le résultat sera identique, en
dépit de la Charte qui exige une approche plus nuancée que l’affirmation
catégorique qu’on retrouve dans la constitution américaine.
L’approche actuelle aux États-Unis a vu le jour en émergeant de
la montée et de la chute ultérieure des interdictions de communication
en auditoire contraint. Les changements variés reflètent les glissements
dans l’importance qu’on accorde aux différentes facettes du discours
de l’employeur : son contenu, sa méthode, le réglage du moment de la
communication et l’occasion de réagir de la part du syndicat.
À l’origine, les restrictions à l’endroit de la communication en auditoire
contraint s’intéressaient au contenu du discours des employeurs, quoique
les employées ne se voyaient offrir aucune protection eu égard à ce type de
communication. Cette approche fut remplacée en 1940 par la doctrine de la
« totalité de la conduite ». Le contenu du discours devint le cœur de l’affaire,
quoique la doctrine reconnaisse le versant coercitif des communications
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de l’employeur. Les employeurs pouvaient faire connaître leur opinion au
moment d’une campagne de syndicalisation, à moins que le discours et la
conduite, dans l’ensemble, ne deviennent coercitifs. Cependant, une décision
datant de 1945, reconnaissait de façon évidente le droit d’expression des
employeurs comme partie inhérente à la garantie du Premier Amendement.
Contre cet arrière-plan, une interdiction de courte durée eu égard aux
communications en auditoire contraint ou obligatoire fut introduite en
1946, mais renversée en 1947. À ce moment-là, la liberté d’expression de
l’employeur devint une exception à l’interdiction d’interférence de la part
d’un employeur dans une campagne de syndicalisation.
Alors, la liberté de parole de l’employeur était protégée en autant qu’elle
ne menaçait pas de représailles économiques et n’indiquait aucun recours à
la force. L’insistance à évaluer si un employeur avait ou non eu recours à
des pratiques déloyales renvoyait au contenu de la communication, plutôt
qu’à la manière ou à la méthode retenue. Une modification ultérieure survint
en 1951 quand les syndicats exigèrent de se voir accorder une occasion
égale de réagir aux messages des employeurs. Autrement, ces derniers
seraient taxés de pratiques déloyales. Cette règle ne s’intéressait pas à
la manière de communiquer, ni au contenu, mais elle prévoyait plutôt la
possibilité d’une réaction. Cependant, peu de temps après, cette règle a été
également supprimée. Elle fut remplacée par la règle de l’arrêt Peerless,
qui demeure encore en effet aujourd’hui. Cette règle interdit les discours
tant chez l’employeur que chez le syndicat au cours de la période de 24
heures qui précède une élection prévue. Cette règle encadre seulement le
moment et le lieu de la communication et oublie la façon de s’exprimer.
Actuellement, une communication en audience captive peut se faire par un
employeur avant cette période de 24 heures qui précède le vote. Cependant,
en dehors d’un contexte syndical, la réglementation américaine en matière
de communication en audience captive diffère de façon importante. Des
limites se présentent dans les cas multiples de communication captive,
fondée sur la notion de protection face à l’écoute obligatoire. Cette approche
est attribuable à un intérêt eu égard à la vie privée et à la liberté individuelle.
Encore que cette protection puisse aussi apparaître comme un corollaire à
la garantie du Premier Amendement.
Les deux visions américaines, que ce soit en contexte de travail ou
autrement, peuvent servir de leçons en matière de droit du travail canadien.
En premier lieu, l’encadrement de cette question joue un rôle important
dans l’élaboration d’une réponse. Un droit constitutionnel l’emportera sur
le droit statutaire. Il a été conçu de cette manière au Canada. La protection
d’un employé dans le cas de rencontres en auditoire contraint reposera
sur une base précaire. L’article 1 est retenu sur une base de cas par cas et
la protection contre la communication en auditoire contraint ne sera pas
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immunisée contre les problèmes que soulève le conflit entre les droits
constitutionnels et les droits statutaires.
De plus, l’expérience américaine soulève également la question du
rôle que jouerait la clause de la liberté d’expression prévue par la Charte
canadienne à titre de protection contre l’écoute obligatoire. La doctrine de la
communication en auditoire contraint et de l’écoute obligatoire présente en
dehors d’un contexte de travail fournit quelques indications sur la manière
dont la Constitution canadienne devrait être aménagée pour fournir une
meilleure protection contre l’écoute obligatoire. Les décideurs au Canada
ont encore à réaliser qu’il existe un véritable lien entre l’écoute obligatoire
et la liberté d’expression.
Pendant que l’expérience américaine s’achemine vers l’atteinte d’un
résultat spécifique où le droit de l’employeur l’emporte sur les droits des
salariés, cette expérience présente néanmoins à la fois une mise en garde
et une occasion de traiter la communication en auditoire contraint dans un
contexte canadien.
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